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Friday, April 17, 2020 | History

3 edition of Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) found in the catalog.

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

  • 137 Want to read
  • 19 Currently reading

Published by Cambridge University Press .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • International institutions,
  • International relations,
  • International Relations - General,
  • Political Science,
  • Politics / Current Events,
  • Public Affairs & Administration,
  • Politics/International Relations,
  • Political Science / International Relations,
  • International agencies,
  • International organization

  • Edition Notes

    ContributionsDarren G. Hawkins (Editor), David A. Lake (Editor), Daniel L. Nielson (Editor), Michael J. Tierney (Editor)
    The Physical Object
    FormatHardcover
    Number of Pages424
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL7767183M
    ISBN 100521862094
    ISBN 109780521862097

    In International Organizations and Military Affairs, Hylke Dijkstra captures the breadth and depth of the interconnections between member states and international book is not only an important scholarly contribution, but also fills a crucial gap for anyone who seeks to gain a better understanding of the politics within international organisations and international military. This book considers the exercise of sovereign powers by international organizations that include the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union in order to answer fundamental questions about the relationship between an international organization and its member states. In their membership of international organizations, states must confer some of Author: Dan Sarooshi.   In their delegation and control decisions, states face trade-offs and have to weigh different cost categories: the costs of policy, administrative capacity, and agency loss. This book will be of interest to scholars, postgraduates, and officials in international organizations and national governments, dealing with questions of international Author: Hylke Dijkstra. Downloadable! Current international relations theory struggles to explain both the autonomy and transformation of international organizations (IOs). Previous theories either fail to account for any IO behavior that deviates from the interests of member states, or neglect the role of member states in reforming IO institutions and behavior. We propose an agency theory of IOs that can .


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Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) Download PDF EPUB FB2

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) [Hawkins, Darren G.] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations 5/5(1). Cambridge Core - UN and International Organisations - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations - edited by Darren G. Hawkins. Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly.

Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated. Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the 5/5(1). Search for "Delegation And Agency In International Organizations" Books in the Search Form now, Download or Read Books for FREE, just by Creating an Account to enter our library.

More than 1 Million Books in Pdf, ePub, Mobi, Tuebl and Audiobook formats. Hourly Update. Delegation and Agency in International Organizations book. Read 2 reviews from the world's largest community for readers.

Why do states delegate certain /5. Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) - Kindle edition by Hawkins, Darren G., Lake, David A., Nielson, Daniel L., Tierney, Michael J.

Download it once and read it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Use features like bookmarks, note taking and highlighting while reading Delegation and Agency in 5/5(1).

Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal agent theory / Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney -- Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits. Who delegates. Alternative Models of principals in development aid / Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J.

Tierney -- US Cited by: A 'read' is counted each time someone views a publication summary (such as the title, abstract, and list of authors), clicks on a figure, or views or downloads the full-text.

Get this from a library. Delegation and agency in international organizations. [Darren G Hawkins;] -- Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this text explores. DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Edited by DARREN G.

HAWKINS DAVID A. LAKE DANIEL L. NIELSON AND MICHAEL J. TIERNEY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo The International Development Association.

DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly.

Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated. Delegation and Agency in International Organizations - edited by Darren G. Hawkins September 1 - Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory. from Part I - Introduction Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this book to your organisation's by: Review of Industrial Organization 'Delegation and Agency in International Organization develops a The volume is unified by thoughtful application of the theory to a range of important cases and also includes more critical perspectives questioning whether PA.

"This volume represents a timely ans stimulating contribution to the newly invigorated study of international organizations the quality of the contributions to the volume is high In sum, Delegation and Agency in International Organizations represents a substantial and stimulating organization the volume stands as a much needed effort to Brand: Cambridge University Press.

Download Delegation and Agency in International Organizations PDF Books Free Agus Political Science Delegation and Agency in International Organizations true By:Darren G.

Hawkins,David A. Lake,Daniel L. Nielson,Michael J. Tierney Published. The logic of delegation to international organizations David A. Lake and Mathew McCubbins. (source: Nielsen Book Data) Summary Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly.

Buy Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) 1 by Hawkins, Darren G.

(ISBN: ) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible : Paperback. Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) eBook: Hawkins, Darren G., Lake, David A., Nielson, Daniel L Manufacturer: Cambridge University Press.

11 Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power KAREN J. ALTER 3 12 Part IV: Directions for future research 12 The logic of delegation to international organizations DAVID A.

LAKE AND MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS References 3 69 Index Pris: kr. Inbunden, Skickas inom vardagar. Köp Delegation and Agency in International Organizations av Darren G Hawkins på   We conceive authority of an international organization as latent in two independent dimensions: delegation by states to international agents and pooling in collective decision making bodies.

We theorize that delegation and pooling are empirically as well as conceptually different. Delegation is an effort to deal with the transaction costs of cooperation which are greater in Cited by: Delegation and Agency in International Organizations.

Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. : Tim Buthe. Delegation and agency in international organizations States, International Organizations, and Principal-­Agent Theory. Add to My Bookmarks Export citation. Type Book Author(s) Darren G.

Hawkins Date Publisher Cambridge University Press Pub place Cambridge Volume Political economy of institutions and decisions. DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations Edited by Darren G.

Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney 12 The logic of delegation to international organizations DAVID A. LAKE AND MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS References Index “Just as no sane farmer would express disappointment because his cow did not lay eggs or hope that his cow might be induced to lay eggs, an intelligent observer should be expected to refrain from critical or hortatory discussion of the functional capacity of the United Nations that is uninformed by an accurate understanding of the realistic possibilities.

'Delegation and Agency in International Organization develops a sophisticated Principal-Agent approach to elucidate the sources, limits and consequences of IO autonomy.

The volume is unified by thoughtful application of the theory to a range of important cases and also includes more critical perspectives questioning whether PA theory provides Format: Tapa blanda.

Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney In the early s, the World Bank came under fire for having financed multiple.

Delegation and agency in international organizations. Chapter: Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-­Agent Theory. Add to My Bookmarks Export citation.

Type Book Author(s) Darren G. Hawkins, EBSCOhost ebook collection Date Delegation and agency in international organiz Library availability. Delegation and agency in international organizations states, international organizations and principal-agent theory' by Hawkins, D.

G., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. Add to My Bookmarks Export citation. Type Book Author(s) Darren G. Hawkins Date Publisher Cambridge University Press Pub place. International organizations (IOs) and institu-tions (IIs) have become an increasingly common phenomenon of international life.

The proliferation of IOs, the growth in treaty arrangements among states, and the deepen-ing of regional integration efforts in Europe and in other parts of the world all represent formal expressions of the extent to which.

The European Union (EU) is composed of its member states. the governments of those member states have signed and ratified successive Treaties outlining the objectives and institutions of the Union, starting with the European Coal and Steel Community of and continuing through the creation and institutional elaboration of today's European Union.

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations convincingly demonstrates the promise-and the potential limits-of principal-agent approaches to the study of international organization generally. It also contributes to our under- standing of a number of specific international organizations.

The book deserves. 图书Delegation and Agency in International Organizations 介绍、书评、论坛及推荐. this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs.

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations的话题. Delegation and agency in international organizations. Martin, L.L. () 'Distribution, Information, and Delegation to International Organizations: The Case of IMF Conditionality'.

This article defines and clarifies the concept of international delegation from both a legal and a social-science perspective. In this respect, its approach is Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3, 7 (Darren G.

Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Pages in category "International organizations based in France" The following 63 pages are in this category, out of 63 total.

This list may not reflect recent changes (). Delegation and pooling in international organizations Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks # Springer Science+Business Media New York Abstract We conceive authority of an international organization as latent in two independent dimensions: delegation by states to international agents and pooling in collective decision making Size: KB.

Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal agent theory / Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J.

Tierney -- Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits -- Who delegates?:. SOVEREIGNTY AND DELEGATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DAVID EPSTEIN* SHARYN O’HALLORAN** I INTRODUCTION Established inthe United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations established to “contribute to peace and security by promoting international.

They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political cal Economy of Institutions and Decisions: Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Hardcover).

Downloadable (with restrictions)! We conceive authority of an international organization as latent in two independent dimensions: delegation by states to international agents and pooling in collective decision making bodies. We theorize that delegation and pooling are empirically as well as conceptually different.

Delegation is an effort to deal with the transaction costs of .Entdecken Sie "Delegation and Agency in International Organizations" von David A.

Lake und finden Sie Ihren Buchhändler. Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to co.Reviews "The focus on three rather than on only one organization sets the book apart from other contributions International Organizations and Military Affairs seems to answer the broader question of how the member states try to minimize agency costs (states can do this through non-delegation, agent selection, or actual control.)The book will be of interest to scholars working .